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Changing the Rules of the Game: Comparing FIFA/UEFA
and EU Attempts to Promote Reform of Power-Sharing
Institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina
LAURENCE COOLEY and JASMIN MUJANOVIĆ
This article compares two international attempts to promote reform of power-sharing
institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: failed European Union-led efforts to promote
reform of the country’s constitution, which was established by the 1995 Dayton Agree-
ment; and the recent successful reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s institutions of football
governance, promoted by the game’s international and European governing bodies,
FIFA and UEFA. The article outlines the history of these two reform processes and
seeks to explain why FIFA and UEFA have been more successful in promoting reform
in this post-conﬂict setting than the EU. It argues that, in contrast to the EU, which
has been vague about the precise reforms expected of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s politicians,
leaving the details to be negotiated by domestic political elites, FIFA and UEFA were
more precise in their demands and were also willing to capitalise on popular frustration
with the governance of the sport and to bypass nationalist elites who stood in the way of
reform.
Introduction
October 2013 and February 2014 witnessed the convergence of unprecedented
crowds in the streets of cities and towns across Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The
motivations behind these gatherings, however, were starkly different and they
tell the story of two existing and possible fates for this polity as a whole. In Febru-
ary 2014, thousands of protestors took to the streets to express their anger with the
country’s politicians’ failure to tackle a stubbornly high unemployment rate, cor-
ruption and economic mismanagement. In what was described as “[t]he most
extensive social and political unrest in Bosnia since the country’s civil war of
1992–95”,1 protests that began in the northern city of Tuzla spread and culminated
with government buildings in the capital, Sarajevo, as well as Tuzla and Mostar,
being set alight, and the resignation of several cantonal governments. These pro-
tests followed smaller-scale demonstrations in June 2013, when thousands
1. Andrew Gardner, “Bosnia Unrest ‘a Wake-up Call’”, European Voice (13 February 2014), available:
<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/bosnia-unrest-a-wake-up-call-/79648.aspx> (accessed
17 February 2014).
Global Society, 2014
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© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The moral rights of the named
author(s) have been asserted.
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blockaded the parliament to protest the government’s inability to adopt a new law
on personal identiﬁcation numbers, required for newborns to receive all relevant
state documentation. On this occasion, as stories of desperately ill children,
unable to travel abroad for treatment without passports, began to spread, outraged
parents organised gatherings—soon joined by masses of students, workers and
pensioners—foreshadowing the events of early 2014. These protests have demon-
strated the growing dissatisfaction of BiH’s citizens with the inefﬁciency of the
political institutions established by the Dayton Agreement that ended the war of
1992–1995, and which established a complex system of power sharing between
representatives of the country’s three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Bosnian
Serbs and Bosnian Croats.2
In October 2013, by contrast, euphoria rather than rage swelled the main strip of
the capital. BiH had qualiﬁed for its ﬁrst major football tournament as an indepen-
dent state; a 1-0 victory over Lithuania saw the national team through to the 2014
World Cup. As the players returned to Sarajevo from Kaunas in the early hours of
16 October, the number of jubilant fans in the streets only grew. Greeted by these
crowds, Zvjezdan Misimović, the most capped player in the team’s history, who
was born in Germany to Bosnian Serb parents and who played as a junior for
BiH’s neighbours and rivals, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),3 declared
from a balcony above the “Eternal Flame”, a prominent World War II memorial
and local landmark: “Ko ne skače mrzi Bosnu, hej, hej, hej!” [“If you’re not
jumping, you hate Bosnia, hey, hey, hey!”]. The chant was taken up with a roar
as burning ﬂares lit up the night sky.
Two and a half years previously, such an outcome seemed highly unlikely, as
BiH’s very participation in international football was threatened by the same insti-
tutional paralysis that lies behind the more recent protests, when the country’s
national football federation (the Nogometni/Fudbalski Savez Bosne i Hercegovine;
N/FSBiH) was suspended by both the Fédération Internationale de Football Associ-
ation (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the sport’s
international and European governing bodies respectively, for failing to reform its
presidency. This presidency had, since the establishment of the organisation follow-
ing the Bosnian War (1992–1995), been shared by three ofﬁcials—one Bosniak, one
Bosnian Serb and one Bosnian Croat—in a similar manner to the country’s political
institutions. In October 2010, FIFA and UEFA called for this arrangement to be
replaced by a single president by the end of March 2011, and the N/FSBiH’s
failure to comply with this demand resulted in its suspension from both organis-
ations on 1 April of that year. This left the national football team unable to partici-
pate in international competition and prevented BiH domestic sides from
competing in European club competitions.4
2. Milada Vachudova, “The Thieves of Bosnia: The Complicated Legacy of the Dayton Peace Accords”,
Foreign Affairs (24 February 2014), available: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140966/milada-
vachudova/the-thieves-of-bosnia> (accessed 21 March 2014).
3. The FRY was a state created in 1992, comprising Serbia and Montenegro, which were the only two
republics that remained following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4. “Football Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Suspended”, FIFA (1 April 2011), available: <http://
www.ﬁfa.com/aboutﬁfa/organisation/news/newsid=1410136/index.html> (accessed 5 November 2013);
“Football Association of Bosnia-Herzegovina Suspended”, UEFA (1 April 2011) available: <http://
www.uefa.org/mediaservices/mediareleases/newsid=1614178.html> (accessed 18 June 2014).
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Seen against this backdrop, the governance of BiH football does not seem so
detached from the political paralysis that has afﬂicted BiH in recent years, and
which culminated in the February 2014 protests. The international community
has been attempting to promote reform of the BiH constitution for the best part
of a decade, with little to show for its efforts. Since the ﬁrst set of major reform
negotiations held in 2005, several high-proﬁle packages of reform have had to be
abandoned in the face of disagreement between the political representatives of
BiH’s three main ethnic groups. By contrast, the BiH football crisis of 2011 was
resolved within two months, following the N/FSBiH’s adoption of new statutes
in accordance with FIFA and UEFA’s demands, despite signiﬁcant initial political
resistance. The central aim of this article, then, is to provide an explanation of
why FIFA and UEFAwere able to succeed in promoting reform of football govern-
ance in BiH, where years of pressure from the international community, led in
recent years by the European Union (EU), have failed to result in substantial politi-
cal reform.
At this point, it is worth acknowledging that the study of sport in political science
and international relations remains a marginal activity and, as Holden notes, can
meet with dismissive responses:
Within IR, attempts to analyse sport… can provoke knee-jerk reactions. It
is sometimes suggested that academic work on sport is at best an indul-
gence, and at worst a distraction from the need for greater justice and
equality in world politics.5
Such reactions, however, underestimate the important role that sport plays in
the daily lives of billions of people, and in shaping their political and—
perhaps most importantly—national identities.6 Moreover, Grix makes a strong
defence of the study of sport by political scientists, arguing that it “can be
used as a window through which to understand developments in… politics”
and differentiating this aim from the more traditional study of sport and politics,
which involves employing the tools and theories of political science to analyse
sport politics and policy.7 Here, we aim to employ the case study of FIFA and
UEFA’s successful engagement with the reform of BiH’s national football federa-
tion to shed light on the wider process of political reform and stagnation in the
country. We argue that FIFA and UEFA have succeeded in promoting reform
where the broader international community, led by the EU, has failed, for a
number of reasons. Whereas the EU has failed to set out the precise reforms
that it expects to be made in BiH, leaving the details to be negotiated by dom-
estic political elites, whose nationalism is seen by European policy-makers as
representative of wider divisions amongst the population of BiH, FIFA and
UEFA were much more precise in their demands and were willing to effectively
bypass nationalists who stood in the way of reform. While incumbent members
of the political and football elite attempted to portray these reforms as foreign
5. Gerard Holden, “World Cricket as a Postcolonial International Society: IR Meets the History of
Sport”, Global Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2008), p. 338.
6. See, for instance, Simon Kuper, Football against the Enemy (London: Orion, 1994).
7. Jonathan Grix, “From Hobbyhorse to Mainstream: Using Sport to Understand British Politics”,
British Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010), pp. 116, 118–122.
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impositions and as insensitive to the domestic political context, widespread
public dissatisfaction with the state of the game enabled FIFA and UEFA to
act decisively.
The article proceeds in three stages. First, it outlines the power-sharing insti-
tutions that were established by the Dayton Agreement that ended the
Bosnian War in 1995, and considers some of the key criticisms that have resulted
in the perceived need for constitutional reform in the country. Second, it outlines
the main attempts that have been made at reforming these institutions, and
identiﬁes explanations made in the literature of why constitutional reform
efforts have so far been unsuccessful. Thirdly, it considers the case of the success-
ful reform of football governance in BiH and attempts to explain why FIFA and
UEFA were able to successfully promote reform where the international commu-
nity has thus far failed, thus sketching out two starkly opposite routes for BiH as
a whole.
Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Ideal-Typical Consociational Democracy
BiH’s current constitution dates back to the Dayton Agreement, which was agreed
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio in November 1995 and signed in Paris
the following month. The Dayton Agreement was signed by the Bosnian, Serbian
and Croatian presidents and had been negotiated by the American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke and the EU Special Representative Carl Bildt. The agreement
contained many provisions intended to bring a negotiated end to the conﬂict
that had started in BiH in 1992, and one of its annexes established a new consti-
tution for the country.
This constitution has been described by scholars of ethnic conﬂict management
as establishing “a classic example of consociational settlement”,8 in which “insti-
tutions correspond to an ideal-typical consociational democracy”.9 Consociation-
alism describes a form of democracy in which groups share power, with the
result that there is “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy
with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”.10 In Arend Lij-
phart’s classic study of European democracies, he argues that consociational
democracies are characterised by four key features: elite-level power sharing
by means of a grand coalition; segmental cultural autonomy; proportionality
between groups in public positions; and group veto rights over vital interests.11
Recent scholarship has attempted to reﬁne Lijphart’s deﬁnition of consociational-
ism and proponents of its use as a mode of conﬂict management suggest that
there is a need to differentiate between corporate and liberal forms of consocia-
tion. In the former, groups are accommodated “according to ascriptive criteria,
such as ethnicity or religion or mother tongue”, whereas a liberal consociation
allows “groups to self-determine their organization and representation” and
“rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections,
8. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London: Hurst,
2002), p. 216.
9. Roberto Belloni, “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), p. 336.
10. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1969), p. 216.
11. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1977), pp. 25–52.
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whether these are ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other criteria based on program-
matic appeals”.12
The Dayton constitution can be characterised as an example of a corporate con-
sociation.13 It established a confederal state composed of two entities: the Repub-
lika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). At the
state level, a rotating three-member presidency and a bicameral parliament were
established. Each of the two entities also has its own president, as well as an
entity government and parliament. The Federation is further divided into 10
cantons, each with its own parliament. Dayton guarantees ethnic representation
by quotas at all levels of government and in the civil service. In addition, veto
rules were established whereby decisions of the House of Representatives (the
lower house of the Parliamentary Assembly) require the votes of at least one-
third of the representatives of each entity, and decisions of the House of People
(the upper house) can be vetoed by a majority of any of the Bosniak, Serb or
Croat delegates. These three ethnic groups are identiﬁed by the constitution as
Bosnia’s ‘constituent peoples’.
The Dayton constitution has been the subject of considerable criticism. Academic
critics have argued that Dayton was the product of an essentialist understanding of
ethnicity, and the view that the conﬂict of 1992–1995 was driven by so-called
“ancient hatreds” between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. According to these critics,
Dayton institutionalised a view of identities as ﬁxed and inherently conﬂictual.14
Belloni, for instance, states that:
Ethnic quotas reinforced the salience of ethnic identity and cleavages,
entrenched many of the ethnic divisions that international intervention
was supposed to soften and eventually overcome, and risked perpetuating
instability.15
Belloni argues that the political institutions established at Dayton in 1995 do little to
encourage politicians to appeal to voters beyond their own ethnic groups, and that
elections in BiH have effectively become ethnic censuses. He argues that “the entire
institutional system is based on ethnicity, which is precisely what divides the
Bosnian peoples” and that “[i]nstead of creating conditions for softening ethnic
identities, the agreement entrenches them by making ethnicity integral to consti-
tutional design”.16
As well as entrenching ethnic politics, from the very start of the Dayton era in
1995, the consociational provisions of the new constitution impeded effective
12. John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary and Richard Simeon, “Integration or Accommodation? The
Enduring Debate in Conﬂict Regulation”, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided
Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 61–62.
13. See, for example, Andrew Finlay, Governing Ethnic Conﬂict: Consociation, Identity and the Price of
Peace (London: Routledge, 2011); Giuditta Fontana, “War by Other Means: Cultural Policy and the Poli-
tics of Corporate Consociation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4
(2013), pp. 447–466.
14. See, for example, David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 1998), pp. 161–162.
15. Belloni, “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering”, op. cit., pp. 336–337.
16. Roberto Belloni, “Bosnia: Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.
15, No. 3 (2009), p. 360; see also Florian Bieber and Sören Keil, “Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons
Learned in the Balkans?”, Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2009), p. 348.
Changing the Rules of the Game 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 04
:03
 02
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
4 
domestic governance. As a former international judge on BiH’s constitutional court
notes, “[i]nstead of a positive elite consensus for cooperation, a negative consensus
under the principle of divide et impera (divide and rule) prevailed”.17 Because rep-
resentation based on ethnicity had resulted in gridlock in Bosnian political insti-
tutions, in 1997 the international community’s High Representative—appointed
in 1995 to oversee the implementation of Dayton—was granted increased
powers, including the ability to remove obstructionist politicians from ofﬁce and
to impose legislation. These powers were used to impose reforms that took BiH
in a more integrationist direction, such as a citizenship law and laws establishing
common national symbols such as the ﬂag, currency, national anthem and ethni-
cally neutral licence plates.18
Despite the imposition of such reforms, critics have continued to highlight the
inefﬁciency of BiH’s political system. As Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis point out,
Bosnia is a country with a population of 3.9 million and yet has 14 legislatures
and associated governments.19 As a result of this complexity, some 56% of the
Bosnian state budget is spent on ﬁnancing public administration rather than pro-
viding public services.20
Partly due to its corporate nature, the consociationalism employed in BiH has also
been criticised for discriminating against citizens who belong to smaller ethnic
groups, who choose not to identify as Bosniak, Serb or Croat, or who are members
of one of the three constituent peoples but who live in the “wrong” entity.21 So,
for example, the only citizens who can be elected to the rotating three-member pre-
sidency are Bosniaks and Croats from the Federation and Serbs from the RS. Citizens
who are Jewish or Roma, for example, and Serbs from the Federation and Bosniaks
and Croats from the RS are not able to run for this ofﬁce.
The International Community and Constitutional Reform
Partly in response to these concerns, external actors—particularly the United States
and the EU—have attempted to promote constitutional reform in BiH. With the
attentions of US policy-makers increasingly drawn away from the Balkans in the
decade following the 11 September attacks on New York and with the development
of the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms, it is the EU that has assumed the role of lead
international actor in BiH. Moreover, the experience of the eastern enlargement of
the Union, and the declaration of the 2003 Thessaloniki EU–Western Balkans
Summit that “[t]he future of the Balkans is within the European Union”,22 has
17. Joseph Marko, “‘United in Diversity’? Problems of State-and-Nation-Building in Post-conﬂict Situ-
ations: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Vermont Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2005), p. 523.
18. Ibid., p. 523; Christian J. Ebner “The Bonn Powers—Still Necessary?”, in P. Jureković and F. Labarre
(eds.), From Peace Making to Self Sustaining Peace: International Presence in South East Europe at a Crossroads
(Vienna: National Defence Academy, 2004), pp. 123–125.
19. Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Nikolaos Tzifakis, “Implementing Reforms in Bosnia and Herze-
govina: The Challenge of the Constitutional Process”, European View, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2008), p. 17.
20. Belloni, “Bosnia: Dayton is Dead!”, op. cit., p. 366.
21. Dejan Guzina, “Dilemmas of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Dayton Bosnia”, National Identi-
ties, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2007), pp. 226–227; Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis, op. cit., p. 17; Belloni, “Bosnia: Dayton
is Dead!”, op. cit., p. 360.
22. European Council, “EU–Western Balkans Summit: Declaration”, European Council, Thessaloniki,
PRES/03/163 (21 June 2003), available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/
03/163> (accessed 9 December 2013).
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led to the view that reform can be promoted in the country using a tool not avail-
able to other external actors: the carrot of membership.
The need for constitutional reform was highlighted as early as 2002 by the then
High Representative and EU Special Representative, Paddy Ashdown,23 but con-
crete efforts to promote reform did not start for several more years. The reform
agenda received a boost in March 2005 when the Council of Europe’s (CoE)
Venice Commission (ofﬁcially, the European Commission for Democracy through
Law), in response to a request from the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly, issued an
opinion that emphasised the need for constitutional reform in order for the
country to meet the demands of the EU accession process, to ensure more efﬁcient
decision-making and to reduce the cost of public administration, and to address the
issue of political representation of citizens not belonging to the “constituent
peoples”.24 This was followed by a resolution adopted by the European Parliament
characterising BiH’s institutional architecture as undermining the viability of the
state,25 and in October 2005 the then EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn,
also highlighted the need for reform.26
As Noutcheva argues, EU policy in BiH now revolves around using conditional-
ity to attempt to promote constitutional reform:
In essence, the reforms demanded by the EU as conditions for establishing
contractual relations with BiH link its membership prospects to changes in
the internal state structure of BiH.27
It should, however, be noted that BiH’s EU membership is not formally conditional
on constitutional reform. Rather, EU ofﬁcials have argued that the country will not
be able to fulﬁl its obligations as a member state under its current constitutional
arrangements.28 Olli Rehn made this very clear in July 2009, when he argued
that “Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be able to join the EU with its present
constitution”.29
23. Paddy Ashdown, inaugural speech, Bosnia and Herzegovina State Parliament, Sarajevo (27 May
2002), available: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417> (accessed
9 December 2013).
24. Council of Europe, “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Powers of the High Representative”, Council of Europe Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2005)
004 (11 March 2005), available: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdfﬁle=
CDL-AD%282005%29004-e> (accessed 9 December 2013).
25. European Parliament, “Regional Integration in the Western Balkans”, European Parliament Resol-
ution P6_TA-PROV(2005)0131 (14 April 2005), available: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/
2004_2009/documents/ta/p6_ta-prov(2005)0131_/p6_ta-prov(2005)0131_en.pdf> (accessed 9 December
2013).
26. Olli Rehn, “From Peace-Building to State-Building”, speech at the Ten Years of Dayton and Beyond
conference, Geneva, 20 October 2005, available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/05/629> (accessed 9 December 2013).
27. Gergana Noutcheva, “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s Normative
Power in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 7 (2009), pp. 1070–1071.
28. Florian Bieber, “Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the
Western Balkans”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 10 (2011), p. 1795.
29. Olli Rehn “Towards a European Era for Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Way Ahead”, speech by EU
Commissioner Olli Rehn, Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, SPEECH/09/349, 24 July
2009, available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/349> (accessed
9 December 2013).
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A number of major attempts at constitutional reform have been made since 2005.
The ﬁrst of these consisted of a series of talks convened by former Deputy Principal
High Representative Donald Hays, which were attended by representatives of BiH’s
main political parties. These talks resulted in the so-called “April Package” of
reforms, which would have strengthened the state institutions at the expense of
the confederal entities. However, the reforms fell narrowly short of the two-thirds
majority required to be adopted by the parliament, by a margin of only two
votes.30 Further talks took place in the northern village of Prud in November 2008.
These also resulted in agreement between the leaders of Bosnia’s three largest
parties, and would have resulted in the establishment of four territorial units
between the state and municipalities. By early 2009, however, with the precise
details of the reform package still to be agreed, the Alliance of Independent Social
Democrats leader Milorad Dodik walked out of the talks, stating that he would
only return on the condition of the Republika Srspka being granted the right of seces-
sion at a future point. Consensus broke down and the Prud Package was abandoned.
Further talks were convened at the Camp Butmir base of EUFOR (the EU’s military
operation in BiH) in October 2009 by the Swedish EU presidency and US diplomats.
The content of these talks was derived from the April Package, but agreement once
again proved elusive. Shortly after the failure of the Butmir talks, the EuropeanCourt
of Human Rights delivered its ruling in a case brought before it by Bosnians Dervo
Sejdić and Jakob Finci, who are Roma and Jewish respectively. The Strasbourg court
ruled that, in effectively barring them from running for the country’s highest ofﬁce,
the Dayton constitution violates the rights of Bosnians not belonging to one of the
three constituent peoples.31 Despite this judgement, little further progress has been
made on the issue of constitutional reform.
A number of explanations have been advanced for why the EU and other external
actors have seemingly been unable to use the prospect of eventual EUmembership to
promote constitutional reform in BiH. Sebastián analyses the April Package reform
attempts, and concludes that the failure of these was due not only to irreconcilable
differences among political elites in BiH, but also to the weak leverage and ambiva-
lent role of the EU. She argues that constitutional reform “featured as a form of infor-
mal conditionality associatedwith the long-term perspective of European integration
with no speciﬁc conditions or rewards attached to it”, and that EU ofﬁcials did little
to set out requirements or guidelines for reform, despite the existence of the Venice
Commission’s opinion and its role in creating a domestic consensus for change.32
Other authors have argued that while conditionality may have been an effective
policy tool with which the EU could promote reform in the countries of the 2004
and 2007 enlargements, the EU faces a very different task in the Balkans. While
they use Croatia as a case study rather than BiH, Freyburg and Richter argue
that when issues of national identity clash with the demands of the EU, the appli-
cant state will not comply with these demands, or will do so in an inconsistent
manner. They claim that where societies are characterised by histories of ethnic con-
ﬂict, the eventual goal of EU membership may be agreed upon by citizens and
30. Soﬁa Sebastián, “The Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Ethnopoli-
tics, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2009), p. 346.
31. On this, see Samo Bardutzky, “The Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution: Judgment in the
Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 December 2009″, European Constitutional Law Review,
Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), pp. 309–333.
32. Sebastián, op. cit., p. 347.
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politicians, but some of the criteria that the EU demands be met as part of the acces-
sion process will not.33 Applied to BiH, a variant of this argument holds that the
EU’s use of conditionality is failing because each of the country’s constituent
peoples holds a different vision for the future of the country.34
The February 2014 protests, however, cast doubt on the extent to which the
failure of constitutional reform efforts can be put down to disagreement between
the constituent peoples, as groups, over the future of the BiH state. A poll con-
ducted on 10–11 February found that 88% of respondents supported the protests.
When broken down by entity, support in the FBiH was 93% and in the RS 78%.35
While the RS president Milorad Dodik tried to portray the protests as essentially
Bosniak and as demonstrating that BiH “is one unhappy country that needs to
be split into three parts so that people could live peacefully”,36 it is clear that the
protestors enjoyed wide support from among members of each ethnic group,
and the protestors themselves were “resolutely anti-nationalist”.37
An alternative explanation for the failure of constitutional reform focuses not so
much on the EU’s ability to successfully employ conditionality to effect reform, but
rather on the scope of EU ambitions. As Belloni notes, all of the reform proposals
that have been made “endorse some variation of Dayton’s basic compromise”,
namely recognition of, and consociational power sharing between, BiH’s three con-
stituent peoples.38 One explanation for the relatively conservative nature of the
reform proposals is that EU policy-makers continue to view BiH through a
rather essentialist lens. Mujkić, for instance, argues that:
This essentialism is clearly visible in the Dayton Agreement as well as in
the everyday practices of international institutions such as the OSCE
[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe], the European
Commission, and the Ofﬁce of the High Representative. All their efforts
have been focused on establishing a stable society by achieving some
sort of equilibrium between three self-enclosed, homogenous particulari-
ties whose existence was presupposed from the outset.39
EU politicians holding this view of BiH has been advanced as an explanation for
why they have responded to resistance to constitutional reform by nationalist
33. Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political
Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), pp. 263–
281.
34. See, for example, R. Bruce Hitchner, “FromDayton to Brussels: The Story behind the Constitutional
and Governmental Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, The Fletcher Forum for World Affairs, Vol.
30, No. 1 (2006), pp. 125–135.
35. “Većina građana podržava proteste, a nasilje predstavlja preveliku cijenu promjena” [“Majority of
Citizens Supports Protests, Violence Too High a Price to Pay for Changes”], Klix (12 February 2014),
available: <http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vecina-gradjana-podrzava-proteste-a-nasilje-predstavlja-
preveliku-cijenu-promjena/140212119> (accessed 7 March 2014).
36. “Protests Show Bosnia Needs to Dissolve, Dodik Says”, Balkan Insight (14 February 2014), avail-
able: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodik-blaims-international-community-for-bosnian-
protests> (accessed 7 March 2014).
37. “Protests in Bosnia: On Fire”, The Economist (15 February 2014), available: <http://www.economist.
com/news/europe/21596572-latest-troubles-bosnia-may-wake-up-countrys-inept-leaders-ﬁre> (accessed
1 April 2014).
38. Belloni, “Bosnia: Dayton is Dead!”, op. cit., pp. 367–368.
39. Asim Mujkić, “We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, Constellations, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007), pp. 117–118.
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party leaders by scaling back their demands.40 According to Bassuener and Weber,
Milorad Dodik, for example, is seen by external actors “as a popular tribune whose
nationalism rationally reﬂects that of his entity”, rather than someonewhose power
stems from the Dayton constitution’s failure to reward moderation.41 Similarly, it
has been argued that an essentialist view of BiH, which interprets the nationalism
of political elites as reﬂecting wider nationalism among each of the constituent
peoples, informs external actors’ approach to reform talks. These talks have
involved only (ethnic) party leaders, despite an ofﬁcial discourse that stresses the
need to involve civil society and non-ethnic forces in BiH society in the consti-
tutional reform process.42
In relation to this argument, it has also been argued that the EU has failed to
project a clear vision of what it expects out of the constitutional reform process.
This forms part of Sebastián’s analysis, outlined above, and Sarajlić, meanwhile,
argues that the EU and other international actors appear “to be more concerned
with the means rather than the ends for securing stability and bringing the country
closer to ﬁnal integration”. As such, they have favoured “consensus between
local ethnopolitical elites over the reforms aimed at altering the illiberal and
exclusion-prone constitutional framework, debilitating the possibilities for any
reform to take place whatsoever”.43 Beyond the need to make the constitution
compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in light of
the Sejdić and Finci ruling and the requirement that political institutions be
made more efﬁcient, EU ofﬁcials have been wary of setting out a clear vision
for a post-Dayton political settlement for BiH. Moreover, the EU appears to be
reluctant to use the full force of its powers to promote reform. Current Enlarge-
ment Commissioner Štefan Füle, for example, has threatened to hold back pre-
accession funds to BiH until local political leaders agree on reforms to make
the constitution compliant with the ECHR,44 but the Union has failed to act on
this threat.45 While domestic elites are committed to the goal of EU membership,
they share a well-founded perception that whatever they do in the short term,
this goal is a distant one and they are willing to call the EU’s bluff by continuing
to rely on mobilising the population with ethnic appeals,46 and this sense of
impunity is heightened by the Union’s failure to act on (or to delay) previous
40. See Laurence Cooley, “The European Union’s Approach to Conﬂict Resolution: Insights from the
Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2
(2013), pp. 172–200.
41. Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, “‘Are We There Yet?’ International Impatience Vs. a Long-Term
Strategy for a Viable Bosnia”, Democratization Policy Council Policy Brief (31 May 2010), available:
<http://democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief1.pdf> (accessed 9 December 2013), pp. 11, 15.
42. Cooley, op. cit.
43. Eldar Sarajlić, “The Convenient Consociation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnopolitics and the EU”,
Transitions, Vol. 51, No. 1–2 (2011), p. 72, emphasis in original.
44. Elvira M. Jukić, “EU Threatens Bosnia Sanctions over Rights Failure”, Balkan Insight (11 October
2013), available: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-might-sanction-bosnia-by-cutting-10-
million-funds> (accessed 1 April 2014).
45. Elvira M. Jukić, “EU Report Rules out Sanctions on Bosnia”, Balkan Insight (23 October 2013),
available: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-will-not-impose-solutions-for-bosnia> (accessed
23 June 2014).
46. On the balance between domestic politicians’ commitment to European integration and their
reliance on ethno-nationalism, see Vedran Dzihic and Angela Wieser, “Incentives for Democratisation?
Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Hercegovina”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No.
10 (2011), pp. 1803–1825.
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threats of sanctions.47 Meanwhile, the EU’s attentions have been drawn away
from the Balkans by the ongoing repercussions of the Eurozone crisis, the
fallout from the 2014 European Parliament elections and by recent developments
in Ukraine, which means that the impetus to act on threats of sanctions is increas-
ingly lacking.48
This failure to follow through on threats to sanction domestic elites for their
failure to make the reforms necessary to enable the successful integration of BiH
into European structures stands in contrast to the much more successful case of
reform of the country’s institutions of football governance, as demanded by FIFA
and UEFA. In the following section, after brieﬂy sketching the historical back-
ground of the politics of football in BiH, we examine how and why FIFA and
UEFA were able to promote this reform, despite considerable domestic political
opposition.
The Politics of Football and its Governance in BiH
On 4 May 1980, the announcement of Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito’s death
was made to an audience of approximately 50,000 football spectators, assembled
in the city of Split to watch Belgrade’s Red Star take on Split’s own Hajduk. A
photographer captured Hajduk striker Zlatko Vujović, seemingly weeping on all
fours on the pitch, with the team’s manager Tomislav Ivić standing a few paces
away, hands clasped over his face, and thus immortalised the moment. The
game was called off at 15:05, local time, never to be resumed.49 On 13 May
1990, a match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star ended early—or, rather,
never truly began—as Zagreb’s Maksimir stadium dissolved into an orgy of vio-
lence between the rival “ﬁrms” of supporters.50 The game was played just a
week after the ﬁrst democratic parliamentary elections in Croatia had seen
Franjo Tuđman’s nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) bloc win
approximately 42% of the popular vote, thus securing just under 60% of the
seats in the new parliament. Leading the Red Star “Delije” was Željko Ražnato-
vić, better known as “Arkan”—then still a relatively unknown gangster (albeit
one wanted by Interpol), who would soon become one of the most infamous
47. See Anes Alic, “Europe Prolongs Threat of Bosnian Sanctions”, Southeast European Times (25 March
2013), available: <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/
2013/03/25/feature-03> (accessed 23 June 2014); Sebastián, op. cit., p. 347.
48. We are grateful to one of the Global Society reviewers for pointing this out.
49. “Anniversary of Marshall Tito’s Death”, Yugoslavia Virtual Museum, 4 May 2009, available: <http://
yugoslavian.blogspot.com/2009/05/anniversary-of-marshal-titos-death.html?q=The+Day+Tito+died>
(accessed 15 December 2013).
50. The Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian-language term for these fan groups is “navijači”. Although they
were heavily implicated in the violence that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia, such groups
are not always nationalist or far-right in orientation. While intra-ﬁrm violence in present-day BiH is cer-
tainly not uncommon, the reputation of navijači for violence is not as bad as that of football hooligans in
the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, and they tend to be more organised and pol-
itically oriented, rather like the Italian “ultras”. See David Goldblatt, The Ball is Round: A Global History of
Football (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 548–549; AndrewHodges, “TheHooligan as ‘Internal’Other? Foot-
ball Fans, Ultras Culture and Nesting Intra-orientalisms”, International Review for the Sociology of Sport,
(2014), doi: 10.1177/1012690214526401.
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war criminals of the Yugoslav dissolution.51 While the uniﬁed Yugoslav league
(and state) lasted another two years, the Dinamo–Red Star match was dramatic
proof that the country was well and truly on its last legs. Much had changed in
10 years.
Recent scholarship has shown how football remained vital to forming the
nascent state and nationalist ideologies of the 1990s.52 Yet while football may
have featured prominently in the symbolic undoing of Yugoslavia, the game
itself survived. In BiH, the war years saw a relatively thriving football culture,
albeit under tremendously difﬁcult conditions, especially in the government-held
areas, under constant threat by Serb nationalist shelling. Our analysis, however,
begins in the period immediately after the war. Nevertheless, it is difﬁcult to
date exactly when reform efforts within the N/FSBiH ﬁrst began, though there
have been several episodes of signiﬁcant structural change in its less than 20
years of ofﬁcial existence.
Having applied for membership in 1992, the Football Association (FA) was not
admitted to the FIFA and UEFA fold until 1996. By 1997–1998, the ﬁrst “inter-
ethnic” football matches began in the FBiH between predominantly Bosniak
and Croat clubs. In 2000–2001, the vestigial Bosnian Croat “Herceg Bosna” (the
non-recognised Bosnian Croat entity that existed between 1991 and 1994) FA
was folded into the FBiH FA and a new statute was adopted by the N/FSBiH
to deﬁnitively establish the organisation as the governing body of BiH football.
Opposition to these changes within the RS FA meant that even as a uniﬁed
BiH Premier League formed that year, FIFA and UEFA banned the RS clubs
from participation in any ofﬁcially sanctioned international matches. Early on
then, FIFA and UEFA indicated that they were willing to sanction those they
deemed responsible for obstructionism. As a result, from the 2002–2003 season
onwards, the Premier League was fully integrated and in addition to league
play, the top tier of club football in the country included the BiH Cup, likewise
featuring sides from both entities.53 FIFA and UEFA, did, however, make an
important concession in order to facilitate the successful merger of BiH’s separate
football federations. They allowed the newly merged federation to adopt a
statute creating a rotating three-member presidency, comprising one president
representing each previous “ethnic” federation, which would continue to exist
as “sub-federations”.54
Despite structurally important changes, football governance in BiH and the
game itself remained beset by the same problems facing society at large. Corrup-
tion, match ﬁxing and cronyism were rife. Yet while similar practices in political
and social life in BiH were largely met by public apathy or acquiescence, in the
51. Jan Stradling,More than a Game: When Sport and History Collide (Sydney: Pier 9, 2009), pp. 204–213;
Goldblatt, op. cit., p. 709.
52. Richard Mills, “Fighters, Footballers and Nation Builders: Wartime Football in the Serb-Held Ter-
ritories of the Former Yugoslavia, 1991–1996”, Sport in Society, Vol. 16, No. 8 (2013), pp. 945–972; Dario
Brentin, “‘A Lofty Battle for the Nation’: The Social Roles of Sport in Tudjman’s Croatia”, Sport in Society,
Vol. 16, No. 8 (2013), pp. 993–1008.
53. “Istorija” [“History”], Nogometni/Fudbalski Savez Bosne i Hercegovine, available: <http://www.
nfsbih.ba/bih/tekst.php?id=7> (accessed 15 December 2013).
54. JonathanWilson, “Three into OneWon’t Go for Bosnia as Fifa and Uefa Ban Hits Home”, The Guar-
dian, 21 April 2011, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2011/apr/21/bosnia-ﬁfa-uefa-
ban> (accessed 14 March 2014); Davide Sterchele, “Fertile Land or Mined Field? Peace-Building and
Ethnic Tensions in Post-war Bosnian Football”, Sport in Society, Vol. 16, No. 8 (2013), p. 975.
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world of football a persistent campaign of popular resistance began as early as
2000.
In 2000, the so-called “BH Fanaticos” (BHF) organisation formed, a ﬁrm dedi-
cated to following the national team at all its away matches and organising specta-
cles, marches, parties and demonstrations at both home and away matches. This
effort has since expanded beyond the football team and into basketball, handball
and other popular national teams.55 From the beginning, however, the BHF posi-
tioned themselves as a ﬁrm with a political stance, declaring “Rat savezu!” [“[We
declare] war on the FA!”].56 In one (in)famous incident in March 2007, fans dis-
rupted a match against Norway in Oslo by throwing ﬂares on to the pitch, delaying
play for an hour as a protest against corruption in the football federation.57
Through numerous media appearances as well as in-game pyrotechnical and
other choreographed displays, the BHF made clear their case that the whole of
the FA structure was irreparably corrupt and politicised and thus had to be
removed.58 In 2006, after organising a series of boycotts and “humanitarian
matches” to draw attention to the problems that existed within the FA, a public
letter was released to the media, signed by 13 BiH players, including current
captain Emir Spahić. The players agreed with the BHF’s analysis of the situation
and, as a result, announced that they would refuse any future call-ups to the
national team until signiﬁcant changes were made to the FA, including the
removal of speciﬁc individuals.59 The drastic action seemed to spur the FA into
action and in 2008, as Meho Kodro was appointed the new coach of the national
team, players, including Rangers FC left back Saša Papac, made a tentative
return. However, Kodro was himself sacked after less than six months because
he refused to lead the team in a friendly match against Iran. The ﬁxture had
been made without his approval, he said, and was, in any case, arranged for pol-
itical rather than sporting purposes. Kodro’s position echoed one long held by
the BHF: they argued that many of the Bosniak members of the FA were cadres
of the Bosniak nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and were thus more
55. Sport in BiH remains tremendously gendered. While women’s teams exist, both at the national and
club level, their following is minimal. It is thus problematic to talk about “national teams” and popular
agency and reformwhile almost entirely excluding women from this analysis. It is worth noting, though,
that the BHF does have a “women’s branch” and that national team audiences seem to be relatively
mixed.
56. The popular BiH rapper Frenkie, a sympathiser of the BHF, penned a popular fan anthem with the
same title, declaring: “Your thieving is evident, it has left traces, you can no longer ignore the thousands
of voices, brave like lions, we’re coming directly for your disgusting heads”. An accompanying music
video was released and is still widely accessible on YouTube, e.g.: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=qO_b7PgK9Ts> (accessed 15 December 2013).
57. Gabriel Kuhn, Soccer vs. the State: Tackling Football and Radical Politics (Oakland, CA: PM Press,
2011), p. 167; Toby Kinder, “Bosnia, the Bridge, and the Ball”, Soccer & Society, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2013),
p. 161; Ed Vulliamy, “How Bosnia’s Pioneering Footballers are Succeeding Where the Politicians
Failed”, The Guardian, 5 November 2011, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/05/
bosnia-footballers-succeeding-politicians-failed> (accessed 14 March 2014).
58. The clearest statement of this was to be found in the organisation’s constitution, the original text of
which is no longer online. Nevertheless, interested readers can read through the collection of “state-
ments” made by the group, on their website, in the “Naš stav” (“Our Position”) section: <http://www.
bhfanaticos.com/index.php/arhiva-nas-stav-mainmenu-66> (accessed 15 December 2013).
59. “Reprezentativci BiH neće igrati dok ne odu Jelić, Dominković, Čolaković i Pašalić” [“National
Team Players Won’t Play Until Jelić, Dominković, Čolaković and Pašalić Are Gone”], Klix (31 October
2006), available: <http://www.klix.ba/sport/reprezentativci-bih-nece-igrati-dok-ne-odu-jelic-dominko
vic-colakovic-i-pasalic/061031019> (accessed 15 December 2013).
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interested in having BiH play “friendly” Islamic countries such as Iran than Euro-
pean opponents whom the team might actually end up facing in European Cham-
pionship and World Cup qualifying campaigns. In response to the sacking, fans
boycotted an ofﬁcial friendly match against Azerbaijan, held in Zenica, and
instead attended a charity match that had been scheduled to take place in Sarajevo’s
Kosevo Olympic stadium. Attendance at the charity match was estimated to be
between 15,000 and 20,000, whereas only 150 fans turned out to watch the ofﬁcial
ﬁxture. Nineteen players joined the boycott, and the FBiH’s state television channel
aired the charity match in place of the game in Zenica.60 Papac, meanwhile, would
not return until 2011 and retired shortly thereafter. He was hailed as a hero by fans
and players alike, above all for his steadfast insistence on shaming the FAwith his
absence and public comments.
By 2008, it was clear that there was a battle being fought for control of football in
BiH. On the one hand, there was a political establishment within the FA, closely
aligned with both the domestic club structure and local political parties and crim-
inal organisations, for whom football was an opportunity, primarily, to launder
money. Once dominant sides in the Yugoslav league such as FK Sarajevo, FK Žel-
jezničar Sarajevo, FK Velež Mostar and FK Borac Banja Luka had been reduced to
ﬂoundering clubs, playing in dilapidated and empty stadia. War had decimated the
sports infrastructure in the country but corruption and gangsterism had ensured
that more than a decade after the ﬁghting had ended, decay still reigned. Worst
of all, those entrusted with reinvigorating the sport had become those most respon-
sible for its ongoing destruction.61
On the other hand, a growing movement of fans, players and honest brokers
within the FA opposed themselves to the growing criminalisation of the game.
They insisted that no convincing argument could be made for why sport ought
to be segregated and politicised, when everywhere else in the world the consensus
(even if purely symbolic) is that its experience is unifying, inspiring and edu-
cational. In FIFA and UEFA they found a receptive audience for this argument.
As Eick notes, “[i]n marketing football publicly including its political role, FIFA
emphasizes football’s social use-value and constantly highlights the capacity of
football to boost ‘social cohesion’ as stated in the FIFA objectives: ‘to improve the
game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, edu-
cational, cultural and humanitarian values’”.62 When presented with proof of poli-
ticisation and criminality actively within the FA, football’s international authorities
moved to stamp it out.
Important changes started to occur both behind the scenes and on the football
pitch. In November 2009, the former secretary general of N/FSBiHMunib Ušanović
and marketing secretary Miodrag Kureš were jailed for ﬁve years apiece for tax
evasion and abuse of ofﬁce over the period 2001 to 2006.63 On the pitch, a dramatic
60. JonathanWilson, “Vogts Add the Finishing Touches to Bosnia’s Footballing Farce”, The Guardian, 1
July 2008, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2008/jul/01/bosniaherzogovina.
worldcup2010> (accessed 14 March 2014).
61. See Sterchele, op. cit., pp. 975–977.
62. Volker Eick, “ANeoliberal Sports Event? FIFA from the Estadio Nacional to the Fan Mile”, City, Vol.
14, No. 3 (2010), p. 288. Of course, the experience of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s demonstrates that sport
can also play a very different, disunifying role.
63. “Bosnia Soccer Ofﬁcials Jailed for 5 Years over Tax”, Reuters (23 November 2009), available: <http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2009/11/23/bosnia-court-soccer-idUKGEE5AM1E020091123> (accessed 15
December 2013).
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shift began to occur as the popular Miroslav “Ćiro” Blažević took over manage-
ment of the national team and led it to what was, at the time, its best ever qualiﬁca-
tion run (a playoff appearance in qualiﬁcation for the 2010 World Cup). Seemingly
buoyed by the arrival of a serious coaching staff (Blažević led Croatia to a surpris-
ing third-place ﬁnish in the 1998 World Cup) and the clean-up within the FA, the
team’s on-ﬁeld performance was clearly improving. The team failed to qualify
for the 2010 World Cup, however, losing the playoff to Portugal, and Blažević
departed shortly thereafter.
The state of football in BiH in 2010 was at a crossroads: popular domestic
pressure had helped to win a handful of important battles but these gains could
easily be overturned if the forces of reaction and corruption were allowed to
regroup. The national team itself was becoming increasingly successful, and was
in the process of becoming increasingly multi-ethnic in composition as Bosnian
Serbs and Croats opted to play for BiH rather than their kin states.64 Yet the
national team’s success depended on the efforts of a functional FA, and it seemed
unlikely that the N/FSBiH could be reformed from within or even through
popular pressure by the fans from without. Nevertheless, Blažević’s success,
albeit short lived, ﬁnally convinced Safet Sušić to take over the management of
the national team, after years of having refused this role. Sušić was arguably the
greatest player to have ever come out of the Yugoslav lands (having been
voted not only BiH’s best ever player, but also Paris Saint-Germain’s) and expec-
tations were high that the soft-spoken “Pape” would only match and exceed
Ćiro’s success.
In February 2010, shortly after Sušić’s appointment, news broke that a BiH
referee had been identiﬁed as a participant in one of the largest match-ﬁxing scan-
dals in UEFA history. The referee was banned for life but the whole of the N/FSBiH
appeared to be implicated in the scandal.65 More was to come. In October, FIFA
and UEFA announced that they expected still further changes to the N/FSBiH:
the three-member, ethnically constituted presidency, with its clear resemblance to
BiH’s rotating state presidency, would have to be replaced by a single president.
Indeed, according to a senior UEFA ofﬁcial, such reform was always envisaged
and indeed promised. The statute establishing the three-member presidency
was, in the view of UEFA, “an interim solution” and assurances were made at
the time that the federation “would soon unite, like most national federations,
under one president”.66 Moreover, the operation of the presidency had proved
to be problematic from the outset, as football writer Jonathan Wilson outlined in
2011:
Certain problems soon arose. The ﬁrst, the one that prompted Fifa and
Uefa to take action, was that the NFSBiH soon recognised that the tri-
partite presidency conferred certain advantages. It could take its three
presidents to Uefa and Fifa congresses and seminars; it was one body,
but with the effective clout of three countries. In practice, the bigger
issue was the voting structure established under the terms of the
64. Kinder, op. cit., p. 161; Vulliamy, op. cit.
65. Eric Pfanner, “Corruption Eroding Level Playing Fields of Europe”, New York Times, 7 January
2011, available: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/sports/soccer/07iht-match07.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0> (accessed 15 December 2013).
66. Wilson, “Three into One Won’t Go”, op. cit.
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statute. The executive committee of the NFSBiH is formed of 15
members, ﬁve from each of the three entities. For a motion to be
passed, rather than just requiring a majority of the committee to be in
favour, there had to be a majority among each group—three of ﬁve Bos-
niaks, three of ﬁve Croats and three of ﬁve Serbs. That made it very
easy to block proposals. In theory even a 12-3 majority on the committee
might not be sufﬁcient to pass a proposal if all three who objected were
from the same group. Even among football federations, the NFSBiH is a
slow-moving body.67
FIFA’s view was that, in addition to the complexities of the power-sharing system
within the N/FSBiH itself, this system had led to problems over accountability and
ﬁnancial management, with the consequence that the federation was at risk of
bankruptcy.68
The BHF and other fans of the national team at once began hoping for FIFA and
UEFA to act, in order to clean up the FA once and for all, but simultaneously feared,
given the climate in the country at large, that such reforms could never pass in BiH.
As though to prove how politicised the game truly was in the country but also how
unlikely any changes were, Milorad Dodik announced, “I am against one president
being elected for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina in any state structure—you
name it, even a bee-keeping association”.69 Inside the N/FSBiH, Bosnian Serb del-
egates resisted reform, as, to a lesser extent, did Bosnian Croat representatives, pre-
senting it as an insensitive foreign imposition.70 True to form, in the six months
allowed by FIFA and UEFA, the N/FSBiH was unable to adopt a new statute and
on 1 April 2011, the governing bodies of world and European football suspended
BiH from all competitions, indeﬁnitely. This raised the spectre that BiHwould effec-
tively cease to exist as a national football team.
It was now that FIFA and UEFA made a radical break with what had by 2011
become the dominant modus operandi of the EU. The EU and the international com-
munity more broadly had withdrawn from active participation in the implemen-
tation of good governance. In place, they had established channels with a roster
of local partners (the heads of the six or seven largest parties, rather than govern-
ment ministries or parliamentary committees or even non-governmental organis-
ation [NGO] or civil society groups) whom they considered the only legitimate
(or seemingly possible) partners in any future reforms in the country. Despite
clear evidence that these political elites were, in fact, explicitly devoted to obstruct-
ing reform, the EU refused to isolate or otherwise punish these individuals and
their associates in any way. Moreover, they demonstrated on several occasions
their willingness to be intimidated and/or to have their “deadlines” totally
ignored. In the case of the former, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs
67. Ibid.
68. “Background Information—Bosnia-Herzegovina”, FIFA (12 April 2011), available: <http://www.
ﬁfa.com/mm/document/memberassociation/general/01/41/67/86/bosniabackgroundpaper.pdf>
(accessed 1 April 2014).
69. “Soccer Bosses Show Bosnia Red Card over Ethnic Rule”, The Age (5 April 2011), available: <http://
www.theage.com.au/sport/soccer/soccer-bosses-show-bosnia-red-card-over-ethnic-rule-20110405-
1cyyg.html?skin=text-only> (accessed 15 December 2013).
70. Kenneth Morrison, “Three’s a Crowd”, When Saturday Comes, No. 292 (June), available: <http://
www.wsc.co.uk/the-archive/917-International-football/8825-three-s-a-crowd> (accessed 1 April 2014).
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and Security Policy Catherine Ashton’s hurried May 2011 appearance to hold talks
in Banja Luka after Dodik threatened to hold a referendum on the abolition of BiH’s
state court system is paradigmatic.71 In the case of the latter, the continued non-
implementation of the Sejdić-Finci decision is only the most recent example.
On paper, both the EU on the one hand and FIFA and UEFA on the other
have transparently clear requirements for membership, yet it is only the football
authorities that have been willing to insist on the implementation of these
requirements when local actors have attempted to “test” their commitments to
these values. In contrast, EU ofﬁcials have insisted that they cannot and will
not impose solutions, while simultaneously pleading and cajoling with a local
class of political oligarchs they ofﬁcially lambast for obstructionism, even as
they steadfastly refuse to engage with any civil society and NGO groups who
offer concrete alternatives.
Within days of the suspension of the N/FSBiH by both FIFA and UEFA, FIFA’s
Emergency Committee, following consultation with UEFA, imposed a “normal-
isation committee” on the BiH FA, to be headed by Ivica Osim.72 Like Sušić,
Osim was a legend of Yugoslav football, having coached the Yugoslav national
side between 1986 and 1992, after a 20-year career as a midﬁelder in BiH and
France. Joining him on the committee were a handful of current club presidents
from BiH and notables from the world of BiH football now coaching abroad, as
well as the former captain of the national team, Sergej Barbarez.73 FIFA pre-
sented the new body with a concrete plan, in two phases, reproduced in full
in Table 1. In essence, FIFA replaced the elected N/FSBiH Executive Committee
with the normalisation committee, on the grounds that the former was not able,
in FIFA and UEFA’s view, to successfully revise its statutes in compliance with
their demands of October 2010. The normalisation committee was then tasked
with making the necessary reforms.74
The approach was a tremendous success; after less than two months, FIFA and
UEFA lifted the suspension. The normalisation committee had adopted a new
statute, the membership endorsed it and the old leadership structure was
purged. The committee remained formally in place until December 2012, when
Elvedin Begić was elected as the ﬁrst single president in the N/FSBiH’s history.
Several of the remaining members of the committee, including Osim, remained
on as part of a so-called mediation committee.75 Domestically, the FA has continued
to struggle with hooliganism and the ﬁnancial solvency of clubs. These, however,
are problems ﬁrmly embedded in the socio-political climate in BiH rather than the
71. See Toby Vogel, “Ashton Agrees to Negotiations with Dodik”, European Voice (13 May 2011), avail-
able: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/ashton-holds-crisis-talks-in-bosnia/71076.aspx>
(accessed 3 January 2014); “Dodik: Odlična pobjeda je dogovor sa Ashton!” [“Dodik: Agreement with
Ashton is an Excellent Victory”], Buka (19 May 2011), available: <http://www.6yka.com/novost/9543/
dodik-odlicna-pobjeda-je-dogovor-sa-ashton> (accessed 7 January 2014).
72. “Normalisation Committee Appointed for Football Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, FIFA
(12 April 2011), available: <http://www.ﬁfa.com/associations/association=bih/media/newsid=1416797.
html> (accessed 15 December 2013).
73. “Meeting of the Bosnia-Herzegovina FFNormalisation Committee with FIFA andUEFA”, FIFA (12
May 2011), available: <http://www.ﬁfa.com/associations/association=bih/news/newsid=1433775/>
(accessed 15 December 2013).
74. “Background Information— Bosnia-Herzegovina”, op. cit.
75. “Begić Elected as NFSBiH President”, UEFA (17 December 2012), available: <http://www.uefa.
com/memberassociations/association=bih/news/newsid=1907704.html> (accessed 15 December 2013).
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negligence of the N/FSBiH. Indeed, it is virtually an “open secret” that most of the
ﬁrms responsible for the brunt of the violence in BiH are essentially paramilitary
branches of certain political parties.76 To wit, while the N/FSBiH has issued ﬁnes
and banned away fans at matches, the parliament has consistently failed to
adopt a law on hooliganism; political oligarchs have been hesitant to criminalise
some of their most loyal foot soldiers.77
Nevertheless, as a gesture of goodwill and support for the new N/FSBiH, in Sep-
tember 2013, UEFA President Michel Platini presided over the opening of the
Table 1. Normalisation Committee Tasks, 11 April 2011.
First phase:
a) To prepare and convoke the ordinary general assembly of 2011, at which the delegates
have to adopt the [N/FSBiH] statutes and take decisions on all other statutory items, by 26
May 2011 at the latest.
b) To ensure that all connections/relationships with any members of the “former” [N/FSBiH]
leadership ([N/FSBiH] Executive Committee and [N/FSBiH] Presidency) are cut immediately
with regard to decision-making in ﬁnancial, administrative, sporting and other matters, and
to establish a road map for improvements in this respect as well.
c) To take all necessary steps to further improve the ﬁnancial situation of the [N/FSBiH], and
to ensure that no new disputes or new ﬁnancial obligations appear and that all currently
known ﬁnancial debts are paid in time and in full transparency.
Second phase:
a) To prepare new elections of all statutory bodies in accordance with the newly adopted [N/
FSBiH] statutes by 30 November 2011 at the latest.
b) To improve the quality within the [N/FSBiH] administration and foster the credibility and
image of the [N/FSBiH] at national level, implementing any measures necessary as discussed
with FIFA and UEFA.
As of the date of its appointment, this normalisation committee has taken over all statutory
rights and duties of the [N/FSBiH] Executive Committee as well as of the [N/FSBiH]
Presidency. The mandate of the normalisation committee will expire after new [N/FSBiH]
Executive Committee elections have been held according to the newly adopted [N/FSBiH]
statutes.
Source: “Normalisation Committee Appointed for Football Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”,
FIFA (12 April 2011), available: <http://www.ﬁfa.com/associations/association=bih/media/newsid=
1416797.html> (accessed 15 December 2013).
76. The NK Široki Brijeg “Škripari” and the Borac Banja Luka “Lešinari” are among themost notorious
of these groups. In 2009, a riot between the Škripari and the FK Sarajevo “Horde Zla” in Široki Brijeg
resulted in the death of one of the Horde Zla members, Vedran Puljić. Puljić, himself a Bosnian Croat,
was shot by a police ofﬁcer with links to a Croat nationalist militia. Oliver Knezović, the ofﬁcer, was
initially detained but helped to escape to Croatia by eight other ofﬁcers. The incident resulted in no sig-
niﬁcant charges and was settled through dubious political manoeuvring. Puljić’s funeral, in Sarajevo,
was attended by more than 7,000 fans from FK Sarajevo, FK Željezničar and other city clubs. The riot
was less of a clash between Croats and Bosniaks than an incident that revealed the false dichotomies
in the nationalist narrative. See also Sterchele, op. cit., for a discussion of the political instrumentalisation
of football by ethnic entrepreneurs in BiH.
77. “Kako je ubijen Vedran Puljić?” [“How Was Vedran Puljić Murdered?”], E-Novine (5 May 2009),
available: <http://www.e-novine.com/region/region-bosna/30685-Kako-ubijen-Vedran-Pulji.html>
(accessed 15 December 2013).
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national team’s new training facility in Zenica, built partially with UEFA funds.78
Signiﬁcant changes had been made and rewards were forthcoming. Why had the
normalisation committee succeeded where the international community had
failed to promote substantive political reform?
The plan FIFA presented to the N/FSBiH is informative. Beginning with the
suspension itself, deadlines were non-negotiable. Secondly, clear culprits and
bad-faith practices were identiﬁed and their removal, likewise, made non-nego-
tiable. Thirdly, through their insistence on ﬁnancial solvency or, at least, good
bookkeeping, FIFA and UEFA ensured that any changes would be lasting
rather than ﬂeeting. As a general motif, FIFA and UEFA simply began to
insist at a certain point that BiH’s “special status” no longer applied. Sixteen
years had passed since the end of the war and the BiH national team, talent
wise at least, was clearly good enough to challenge for a spot at the European
and World Championships. As such, like every other national FA, the N/
FSBiH would have to adopt certain universal standards that applied to all
members. When they announced that BiH was to be suspended, FIFA and
UEFA were criticised in some quarters for being out of touch with the realities
of sectarian division in the country.79 Yet the fact that domestic pressure had
helped to almost completely discredit the local authorities made the eventual
“international intervention” a welcome reprieve—one that could not be easily
discredited as “foreign imposition(s)”. While concerns were expressed that a sus-
pension would primarily damage the players rather than N/FSBiH ofﬁcials, a
number of players and other prominent public ﬁgures openly called on FIFA
and UEFA to punish the latter.80
In perhaps a ﬁnal ironic turn, during his stint as head of the normalisation com-
mittee, Osim met with Dodik, along with numerous other political ﬁgures in the
country, in order to win their blessing for the reforms. But according to Osim
himself, it was Dodik who was always the key player. Asked why, he explained:
Dodik is the only one this country who decides anything. ‘Our’ guys have
no courage to do anything at their own expense. You can’t say anything to
anyone because they’re all afraid of someone else. With Dodik you know
where you stand.81
Osim had come to Dodik with a clear mandate, empowered by FIFA and UEFA,
and won his acquiescence because of it, despite the latter’s bravado. Dodik may
well have preferred to maintain the old N/FSBiH—fractured, corrupt and easy
to manipulate—but he came under pressure not only from Bosniaks and the
78. “UEFA President Opens NFSBiH Centre”, UEFA (3 September 2013), available: <http://www.uefa.
org/aboutuefa/organisation/president/news/newsid=1990109.html#uefa+president+opens+nfsbih+centre>
(accessed 15 December 2013).
79. See, for example, Morrison, op. cit.; and Leander Schaerlackens, “FIFA, UEFA Never Been Ones for
Sensitivity”, ESPN Soccer (1 April 2011) available: <http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/blog/_/name/
schaerlaeckens_leander/id/6280268/ﬁfa-uefa-never-ones-sensitivity> (accessed 1 April 2014).
80. See Sterchele, op. cit., pp. 981–982.
81. “Ivica Osim: ‘Dodik je jedini koji u ovoj državi nešto odlučuje, sa njim znaš na čemu si… ’” [“Ivica
Osim: ‘Dodik Is the Only One Who Decides Anything in This State, With Him You Know Where You
Stand’”], Slobodna Bosna (5 May 2011), available: <http://www.24sata.info/sport/fudbal/64013-Ivica-
Osim-Dodik-jedini-koji-ovoj-drzavi-nesto-odlucuje-njim-znas-cemu.html> (accessed 15 December
2013).
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international football authorities, but also from other Bosnian Serbs, whowanted to
see Borac Banja Luka (who had just won their ﬁrst BiH Premier League title) take
their place in the qualifying rounds for the UEFA Champions League.82 Faced by
the prospect of losing access to the European and international football
market altogether, Dodik and other nationalists were prepared to yield to FIFA
and UEFA’s demands.
The contrast between the incentives offered for reform of BiH’s constitution and
its football governance structures is also instructive. Whereas the consequences of
failure to make the reforms demanded by FIFA and UEFA were very clear—BiH
would no longer be able to play international football—the international commu-
nity proper has, as we saw above, been ambivalent about its insistence on consti-
tutional reform. Hence, ﬁve years after the Sejdić-Finci decision, barely a single
step has been taken by any of the local political actors in BiH to actually implement
the ruling. For all of the EU’s threats, nationalist elites in BiH do not believe that the
Union would carry through with them, as the track record shows. On the odd
occasion where some concessions have been extracted (such as Dodik’s agreement
with Caroline Ashton to scrap his proposed referendum on BiH’s courts system),
the local establishment has merely spun this as a victory for themselves. In the
case of the Ashton summit, it was portrayed as a remarkable concession won by
Dodik against the might of Europe, rather than any kind of climb-down,83 or as
is the current, episodic trend with the Sejdić-Finci summits, the “difﬁcult but sig-
niﬁcant last-minute agreement”, usually with the substantive details left for
another date and thus never implemented. In short, while FIFA and UEFA have
refused to be played, the EU has been embarrassed repeatedly by BiH’s nationalist
elite, who seek to obstruct the reform of a political system that sustains their power.
Conclusion
The protests that broke out across BiH in February 2014 served to highlight popular
frustration with a broken political system. Almost two decades after the signing of
the Dayton Agreement, the constitution that it established has left BiH with an
unwieldy public administration, and the country in breach of the ECHR and
unable to make substantive progress towards the goal of EU membership.
Despite numerous internationally sponsored attempts to forge agreement on con-
stitutional reform, there is very little to show for years of intermittent reform talks.
Mainstream accounts of the failure of constitutional reform have portrayed BiH
as a country deeply divided along ethnic lines, in which nationalist elites reﬂect
these divisions. Reform efforts have generally started from the premise that these
elites represent public opinion and their obstructionism has therefore been inter-
preted by the international community as a sign that there is a lack of consensus
between BiH’s three “constituent peoples” that makes reform extremely difﬁcult,
if not impossible. While rhetorically, external actors have emphasised the need
for civil society voices to be heard in debates about constitutional reform, the
82. Edin Dedovic, “The Bosnian National Football Team: A Case Study in Post-conﬂict Institution
Building”, openDemocracy (14 October 2013), available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/edin-dedovic/bosnian-national-football-team-case-study-in-post-conﬂict-instituti>
(accessed 25 June 2014); Sterchele, op. cit., p. 989, n. 43.
83. See “Dodik: Odlična pobjeda je dogovor sa Ashton!”, op. cit.
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talks themselves have been held in private and between members of a narrow pol-
itical elite. Even though EU ofﬁcials and other external actors have criticised this
elite for their failure to agree reforms, the constitutional reform process has not
been opened up to a broader range of participants because of the dominant view
that elite divisions reﬂect mass divisions.
FIFA and UEFA’s attempts to reform football governance in BiH, by contrast, tell
a very different story about international engagement. Rather than viewing the
country through the lens of ethnic division, football’s international and European
governing bodies were able to capitalise on popular resistance to the corruption
and criminality that lay at the heart of football in BiH, and to overcome political
resistance in order to achieve rapid progress with reforming inefﬁcient and mis-
managed institutions of governance. Interestingly, the case of BiH may not be
unique. In November 2013, following talks at FIFA’s headquarters in Zurich, the
Cyprus Football Association and the Cyprus Turkish Football Association signed
a provisional agreement which, if implemented, will see the latter become a
member of the former, thus unifying football governance on the island.84 This
comes after years of failed attempts to unify Cyprus politically—latterly, in the
context of its accession to the EU.
Football’s governing bodies, and especially FIFA, have often been the subject of
ﬁerce criticism, not only in footballing, but also in political and academic circles.
FIFA is frequently accused of corrupt practices, particularly in relation to the
process by which World Cup host countries are selected, and of lacking account-
ability, and is described as an agent of neo-liberalisation and the increasing commo-
diﬁcation and commercialisation of the game, to the perceived detriment of fans.85
At the time of writing, FIFA is investigating allegations that corruption inﬂuenced
the bidding process that resulted in Qatar being awarded the right to host the 2022
World Cup.86 As Hoberman argues, the ethically compromised leadership of inter-
national sports organisations such as FIFA discredits their claims to constitute a
peace movement.87 Yet, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina at least, FIFA and
UEFA have demonstrated that they have been able to exert their inﬂuence to
achieve much more substantive reform, in a shorter period of time, than the EU
and other external actors have been able to with regard to the country’s political
institutions. The international footballing authorities have done so not only
through setting out clear demands, but also by seizing on popular domestic
pressure for reform, demonstrating the importance of coalitions of external and
domestic actors to securing political reform.88 This, we suggest, highlights the
84. See “Cyprus Football Association and Cyprus Turkish Football Association Sign Landmark
Arrangement”, FIFA (5 November 2013), available: <http://www.ﬁfa.com/aboutﬁfa/organisation/news/
newsid=2218369/index.html> (accessed 7 January 2014).
85. See, for instance, Eick, op. cit.; Andrew Jennings, Foul! Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals
(London: HarperSport, 2006); Andrew Jennings, “Investigating Corruption in Corporate Sport: The
IOC and FIFA”, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2011), pp. 387–398; Roger
Pielke Jr., “How Can FIFA Be Held Accountable?”, Sport Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2013),
pp. 255–267.
86. See “Qatar 2022: Fifa Set to Probe Ofﬁcials overWorld Cup Claims”, BBC Sport (4 June 2014), avail-
able: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/27692237> (accessed 18 June 2014).
87. John Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force”, SAIS Review, Vol. 31,
No. 1 (2011), pp. 17–29.
88. On this point more broadly, see Wade Jacoby, “Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External
Inﬂuences on Postcommunist Transformations”, World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2006), pp. 623–651.
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potential value in further research not only into the governance of sports in post-
conﬂict and divided societies, but also into the role that international and regional
sports governing bodies can play in exerting often signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the
domestic affairs of their member associations.89 FIFA president Sepp Blatter calls
this the “political dimension” of football, and claims that “we don’t want to inter-
vene in politics, but football can offer to political entities solutions”.90 This dimen-
sion is worthy of further research and critical scrutiny.
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